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  Abstract 
We consider here the evaluation of the performance of a 
society with respect to a given set of targets. We provide a 
characterization of an intuitive evaluation formula that 
consists of the mean of the achievement to target ratio. The 
criterion so obtained permits one not only to endogenously 
determine who meets the standards and who does not, but 
also to quantify the degree of fulfillment. Two empirical 
illustrations are provided: compliance with the European 
Union Stability and Growth Pact, on the one hand, and the 
evaluation of research excellence in Spanish universities, 
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  Resumen 
Este documento de trabajo aborda el problema de evaluar 
el cumplimiento, por parte de una sociedad, de un conjunto 
de objetivos cuantitativos previamente determinados. In-
cluye la caracterización axiomática de una sencilla fórmula 
de evaluación que consiste en el valor medio de las ratios 
entre los logros alcanzados y los objetivos propuestos. Este 
criterio permite determinar no solo qué agentes cumplen 
con los estándares fijados sino cuál es su grado de cum-
plimiento. El trabajo incluye dos ilustraciones empíricas, 
una relativa al Pacto Europeo de Crecimiento y Estabili-
dad, y la otra a la determinación de la excelencia investi-
gadora en las universidades españolas. 
 
 
  Palabras clave 
Cumplimiento de objetivos, criterio Bonus/Malus, objeti-
vos múltiples, monotonía aditiva. 
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CONSIDER an organization consisting of several units whose performance is to be evaluated with 
respect to a vector of targets or reference values previously set. This is a very general scenario that 
may appear under many different formats. Depending on the problem under consideration, those tar-
gets may represent absolute values (objectives to be reached or admissible levels externally given), 
relative performance thresholds (quantiles of the actual distribution of achievements), or a mixture of 
both (as in the European Union convergence criteria, which involved absolute thresholds concerning 
deficit and public debt, and relative thresholds, concerning inflation and interest rates). We can imag-
ine the purpose of the evaluation as the allocation of some resources among those who qualify (pro-
ductivity bonuses, financial aids, or social transfers, say) and/or prestige or recognition (e.g. identify-
ing high quality institutions). The evaluation procedure itself may be conceived as a simple dichoto-
mous criterion (determining who meets the standards as a bonus/malus classification), an attempt at 
providing quantitative estimates of the overall degree of fulfillment (e.g. the evaluation of individual or 
collective achievements), or something in between (e.g. classification in different categories). 
We shall refer to the organization as a society and to the incumbent units as agents. The 
key feature of the problem is the existence of a society with many agents whose performance is 
to be evaluated with respect to a given set of multidimensional targets, to be called standards. 
Note that in some cases meeting the standards implies attaining values below the thresholds 
(e.g. when we consider the case of financial aid, or insurance premiums). 
Deciding who meets the standards in a multidimensional scenario is not immediate. Two 
extreme positions can be considered. On the one hand, there is the most demanding interpretation 
by which meeting the standards means achieving all target values simultaneously. On the other 
hand, there is the other extreme interpretation according to which achieving some target is a suffi-
cient criterion. Each of those polar views makes the decision on who meets the standards rather 
trivial. The drawback is that in both cases we may find very unfair outcomes, as we may be giv-
ing an equal treatment to highly different performances. The difficult problem is, of course, how 
to handle the intermediate cases. That is, when agents in society exceed some of the prescribed 
targets but fail to reach others (a relevant case in practice and a common source of conflicts). The 
bottom line is whether we admit or not compensations among achievements, both across dimen-
sions and across agents, and what kind of compensations should be considered (we shall refer to 
this feature as the substitutability problem). 
Let us consider two cases that illustrate well the key features of this type of evaluation problem. 
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Example 1:  The European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).-  The SGP is an 
agreement among the 16 members of the European Union that take part in the Euro 
zone, to facilitate and maintain the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union. It 
involves setting reference values for some key public finance variables and aims at 
enforcing fiscal discipline after the monetary union (member states adopting the euro 
have to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, and the SGP ensures that they 
continue to observe them). The basic reference values are two: (a) An annual budget 
deficit no higher than 3% of GDP; (b) A national debt lower than 60% of GDP. The 
question is: Are the countries in the Euro zone complying with the SGP? 
 
Example 2: Research excellence in Spanish Universities.- It is well known that Spanish uni-
versities are not subject to regular evaluation processes, contrary to what happens to re-
search groups or faculty. As a consequence, society tends to assume that all universities are 
similar and the market does not discriminate between graduates from different universities. 
Yet there are some data that would allow evaluating the research performance of Spanish 
universities. The question is: Can we identify the set of universities that excel in research, out 
of the distribution of results in different research dimensions? 
 
Those examples illustrate two specific cases of the evaluation problem under consid-
eration. In both examples the evaluation may require us not only to identify those who meet 
the standards, but also to estimate their degree of success. In Example 1 the standards are 
fixed externally (absolute thresholds) whereas in Example 2 the standards are relative to the 
actual performance. Therefore, we can also consider the question of whether some specific 
objectives have been reached in Example 1, whereas this type of question is meaningless in 
Example 2. Also observe that meeting the standards in Example 1 means having values of the 
index below the thresholds, whereas in Example 2 it means values above the thresholds. 
This type of problem can be regarded as a case of multicriterion decision making (e.g. 
Kenney and Raiffa [1976], Yu [1985]). The proposed solutions may be interpreted as a class of com-
promise solutions on specific domains that evaluate the achievements in terms of some distance func-
tion (see, for instance, Romero [2001], André, Cardenete and Romero [2010, ch. 9]). Our approach, 
however, stems from the principles that are applied for the analysis of development, inequality and 
poverty. Roughly speaking development measures allow to estimate the achievements, the targets play 
a similar role to the poverty thresholds, and inequality enters the picture as measuring the degree of   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




substitutability among the achievements. See Bourguigon and Chakravarty (2003), Chakravarty 
(2003), Tsui (2002), Herrero, Martínez and Villar (2010), Seth (2010), and Villar (2010). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic model. We present there 
the key assumptions and the essential ideas of this contribution by means of a simple and intui-
tive evaluation function: an arithmetic mean of the achievement to target ratio. The axioms we 
use for that are fairly standard: weighted anonymity (any two agents with the same weight and 
the same realizations are indistinguishable), weighted neutrality (all dimensions that enter with 
the same weight are equally important), a normalization property, and additive monotonicity 
(an increase in the realizations entails an increase in the evaluation function that depends posi-
tively on the size of that increment). Section 3 introduces a more flexible evaluation model, 
allowing for different degrees of substitutability between agents and dimensions, by character-
izing the uniparametric family of generalized means. Section 4 contains an empirical illustra-
tion of this approach by analyzing the two examples presented above: the performance of coun-
tries in the Euro zone regarding the EU Stability and Growth Pact, and the selection of the set 
of excellent Spanish universities from a research viewpoint. A few final comments are set out 
in Section 5. 
2.  The Basic Model 
LET N  {1,2,...,n} denote a society with n  agents and let K  {1,2,...,k}  be a set of character-
istics, with k  2. Each characteristic corresponds to a variable that approximates one relevant di-
mension of the performance of the society under consideration. A realization is a matrix  {} ij Yy   
with  n  rows, one for each agent, and k  columns, one for each dimension. The entry  ij y Rw  de-
scribes the value of variable  j  for agent i. Therefore, 
nk R  is the space of realization matrices and we 
assume implicitly that all dimensions can be appro-ximated quantitatively by real numbers. 
There is a parameter vector of reference values z
k
 R  that describes the standards 
fixed for the different dimensions. Those standards may be set externally (absolute thres-holds) 
or may depend on the data of the realization matrix itself (relative thresholds, such as a specific 
quantile or a fraction of the mean value). We shall not discuss here how those thres-holds are 
set, even though the importance of that choice is more than evident.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




In order to deal with agents of different size or importance (e.g. families, firms, re-
gions, countries), there is a vector 
n
 R  that tells us the weights with which the differ-rent 
agents enter into the evaluation. Similarly, in order to allow for the presence of targets of 
different merit, we introduce a vector 
k
 R  that puts weights on the different dimensions. 
An evaluation problem, or simply a problem, is a point  (,,,) z  PY   in the space 
nk k n k
     RRRR . We denote by  () M PN   the set of agents who meet the stan-
dards in problem P . 
2.1.  Measuring the achievements 
In order to evaluate the overall achievements of the society with a realization matrix Y , 
relative to the reference vector z , and weighting vectors  ,  , we look for a continuous func-
tion  :  R  that associates to each problem  P    a real value  () P   that provides a 
measure of its performance. This function is determined by a set of intuitive and reasonable 
properties that we introduce next. 
The first property we consider, weighted anonymity, establishes that all weighted agents 
are treated alike. That is, if we permute agents' realization vectors together with their associated 
weights, the evaluation does not change. 
 
1.  Weighted anonymity: Let (,,,) z   Y   and let  () , ()  Y    denote a permuta-
tion of the indices of the rows of matrix Y  and the corresponding entries of vector 
 . Then,  (,,,) (() , , () , ) zz    YY     .  
 
The second property, weighted neutrality, says that all weighted dimensions are equally 
important. That can be expressed, in line with the definition above, as follows: 
 
2.  Weighted neutrality: Let (,,,) z   Y  and let  () , ()  Y    denote a permuta-
tion applied to the indices of the columns of matrix Y  and the corresponding en-
tries of vectors  z  and  . Then,  ( , , , ) ( ( ), ( ), , ( )) zz     YY     .  
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Our next property, normalization, makes the value of the index equal to zero when 
0 Y   (the null matrix) and equal to  iN  i  jK  j  when Y  Z  (where  Z  (z,z,...,z) is 
the matrix whose columns repeat the target vector z  for each agent)
 1. Formally: 
 
3.  Normalization:  (,,,) 0 , (,,,) 0z z   iN jK ij Z        .  
 
Our last property, additive monotonicity, establishes conditions on the behavior of the evaluation 
function when the matrix of the agents' achievements changes from Y  to YY Y   , for some 
nk Y  R . The property requires the change of the index to be a monotone function g of the change 
Y   in the realization matrix. This is a very natural property that is most useful when the data on the 
agents' performance is collected from se-veral sources, or across different time periods, or when there are 
mistakes to be corrected. The new data can be integrated by simply computing the value of that function 
g regarding those new data and adding up the result to the original value of the index. Formally: 
 
4.  Additive monotonicity: Let (,,,) z   Y   and let 
nk Y  R . Then,  
    (, , , ) ( , , , ) , , , zz z    YY Y g Y     
 
for some increasing function 
: g R .  
 
Note that this requirement is cardinal in nature and involves a separability feature of the 
overall index. Indeed, it implies that increasing the achievement of an agent in a given dimen-
sion by one unit will have the same impact on the index, no matter the level at which this hap-
pens (perfect substitutability of weighted agents and weighted dimensions)
 2.  
 
Remark: It is easy to see that additive monotonicity and normalization together imply 
additivity, that is,     (, , , ) ( , , , ) , , , zz z      YY Y Y      . 
                                                        
1 This simply extends the idea that the index is equal to one when Y = Z and all agents and all targets are 
equally important (i.e.  1/ i n    for all iN  ,  1/ j k   , for all  kK  . 
2  This property may have an ethical content when agents are made of several individuals (e.g. the 
branches or the divisions of a firm) and the evaluation involves some rewards. It ensures the neutrality of 
the rule with respect to the order in which data are computed. 
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The following result shows that all those requirements yield an evaluation function that corre-
sponds to the arithmetic mean of the weighted shares of the achievements in the targets. Formally: 
 
Theorem 1: A continuous function  :    R  satisfies weighted anonymity, weighted 














Moreover, those properties are independent. 
 
Proof:  
(i)  The function in [1] satisfies all those properties. We prove now the converse. 
Let  (,,,) z  PY    and let   
nk
ij a  R  be a matrix with all elements other 
than (, ) i j  equal to zero and the (, ) i j  entry equal to a . 
By applying repeatedly additive monotonicity we can write: 
    () ,,, z  ij ij iN jK Pg y 
    
 
Let now [,, . . . ,] a 11 1  denote a uniform matrix whose generic element is a and 
take  s  z1 ,  p  1  ,  d   1 , for some positive scalars  ,, s pd where 1  is the 
unit vector in the corresponding space. Note that, in this special case and in view 
of the weighted anonymity and weighted neutrality properties, we have: 
 
   ,, , ,, , , , , , ij ht g as p d g as p d i j N h t K        11 1 11 1  
 
Therefore, we can write: 
 
 
([1,...,1]a, 1s,1p,1d)  kn  g ij a  ,1s,1p,1d    
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From that it follows: 
 
 
 (Y ,z,,) 
1




Now observe that our assumptions imply that   is linearly homogeneous, that is, 
(, , , ) ( , , , ) zz   YY     , for all  0   . Let now 
4 : f    RR  be gi-
ven by:  (,,,) : ( [ , . . . , ], , , ) 11 111 ij j i j ij j i j fyz y z      . As this function inher-
its the linear homogeneity property and satisfies normalization, by taking  ij j yz   
and  
yij






























(ii)   To separate the properties let us consider the following indices, for  1/ i n    for 
all i  (anonymity),  1/ j k    for all  j  (neutrality): 





iN jK nk z Y     z1 1 . It satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and ad-
ditive monotonicity but not normalization. 
(ii,b)   




iN nk z Y    z1 1 . It satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and 
normalization but not additive monotonicity. 
(ii,c)   




iN jK i nk k z Y     z1 1 , with  1 iN i      and  1/ i n    for 
some i . It satisfies neutrality, normalization, and additive monotonicity but 
not anonymity.  
(ii,d)   




iN jK j nk n z Y     z1 1 , with  1 jK j      and  1/ j k    for 
some  j . It satisfies anonymity, normalization, and additive monotonicity 
but not neutrality.  
q.e.d.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




This theorem tells us that assuming weighted anonymity, weighted neutrality, normali-
zation, and additive monotonicity amounts to measuring social performance as the (weighted) 
arithmetic mean of the agents' relative achievements. 
It is interesting to observe that equation [2] provides an implicit estimation of the per-
formance of agent i with respect to dimension  j ,  (,,,) ij eY z   , that is given by the evalua-
tion of a fictitious society with a uniform realization matrix [ ,..., ] ij y 11, a uniform reference 
vector  j z 1 , and a uniform weighting system 1 i  ,  j  1 . That is,  
 
( , , , ) ([ ,..., ] , , , ) yz 1 1 1 1 1  ij i ij j i j ey z     [3] 
 
This allows us to estimate the overall contribution of an agent, by simply computing: 
 
1



















that is, as  i n  times the weighted sum of all her relative achievements. Trivially, when 
1/ i n    we have the weighted sum of the  / ij j yz  values. 
Similarly, we can have a measure of the overall success of society in a given dimension, as 
3: 
 




















                                                        
3
 Note that computing the success in a given dimension makes sense when the thresholds are externally 
given and may not be meaningful when they correspond to functions of the actual values of the realiza-
tion matrix.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




2.2.  The agents who meet the standards and the targets that 
have been reached 
Let us consider now the question of who meets the standards and whether we can consider 
that a given target has been collectively achieved. In our model those problems are solved endoge-
nously by the very formula that measures the overall performance. In order to facilitate the exposition, 
we focus on the case in which meeting the standards means achieving values above the established 
thresholds. In that case, an agent with  ij j yz  , for all  j , certainly meets the standards. 
Consider now an agent h  in the limit case in which  hj j yz  , for all  j K  . Accor-ding to 
equation [3], the overall performance of this agent is given by:      ,, , , jK hh h j CY n       zz   
(where  (, ) h Y z  describes a matrix whose h th row is precisely z ). Therefore, the set  () M P  of 

















(note that we allow for the existence of agents in  () M P  whose achievements are below the target in 
some dimension, provided they are compensated with over compliance in other dimensions). 
Equation [6] permits one to directly identify the set of those who meet the standards in 
the  k -dimensional space in which we plot on 
k R  all agents' vectors of relative achievements, 
11 1 22 2 ( , ) ( / , / , ..., / ) ii i k i k k y zy z y z    yz  , for all iN  . Indeed, the set  () M P  is given 
by all those agents whose vectors of relative achievements are above the hyperplane defined by 
() jK jK ij j y     z .  
When the reference values 
k
  zR are externally given (i.e. they correspond   
absolute thresholds), we can also consider whether a specific objective has been reached by 
society. According to equation [5], objective  j  is achieved provided 
  (,,,) , ,,,
j
iN ji j j SY S Y z 

   z1 z   , where (,)
j
j Yz
 1  describes a matrix whose 
j th column is equal to zj in all entries. Therefore, the set of objectives that have been col-
lectively achieved are those that satisfy the following condition:   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 












    
[7] 
3.  A More Flexible Formulation 
THE additive structure of the evaluation function   in Theorem 1 implies a particular trade-off 
between the different achievements, as the evaluation only depends on the sum of the agent's 
relative realizations but not on their distribution. So each agent can substitute any relative reali-
zation for another one at a constant rate (equal to  /, j t     for all  , j tK  ) no matter the level 
at which this happens. Similarly, the relative achievements of one agent in a given dimension 
can be substituted by those of another one, once more at a constant rate (here we find a mar-
ginal rate of substitution equal to  / ih     for all  , ih N  ). 
One might be willing to consider evaluation criteria that incorporate variable degrees of 
substitutability (e.g. decreasing marginal rates of substitution which implies penalizing the ine-
quality of realizations across agents and/or dimensions, which may actually be a reason to 
introduce such a criterion). The simplest way of allowing for variable substitutability across 
agents and dimensions is by looking for a uniparametric extension of the formula in Theorem 
1, so that controlling a single number permits one to regulate the degree of substitutability. To 
arrive at such a formula, let us start by performing the following exercise. Let 
(,,,) PY   z  , be a problem with Y  strictly positive (i.e.  0 ij y   for all  , ij ) and consi-
der the transformation  () Y   of Y  given by  () ( ) ij ij yy
   , for all i, j , and the transformation 
()  z  of vector z  given by    () jj z z

   for all  j , some scalar  . Call  () P   to this trans-

















The parameter   controls the impact of the individual deviations of the targets on the 
evaluation index. The larger the value of   the larger the impact of values above the reference   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




level and vice versa. In particular, the parameter   controls the degree of concavity (for  1   ) 
or convexity (for  1   ) of the function. 
Note that we require  0 ij y   for all entries of matrix Y , in order to avoid inconsisten-
cies. We therefore, set    nk k n k
        RRRR  as our reference space from now on. 
What should be the relationship between the evaluation of problems  () P   and P ? 
The following property answers that question: 
 
5.   -Power: Let    (,,,) PY   z  and let    () (() ,() ,,) PY       z  de-
note a problem derived from the previous as follows. Each  ij y  in Y  is substituted 
by  ij y

 and each  j z  in z  is substituted by   j z










This property mimics the principle applied by the variance to the measurement of dif-
ferences to the mean. If we take the power   of all relevant parameters of the problem, then 
we re-scale the resulting formula by taking the inverse power. 
The following result is trivially obtained 
4: 
 
Theorem 2: An index    :   R  satisfies weighted anonymity, weighted neutra-
lity, normalization, additivity and  -power, if and only if it takes the form: 
 























     

   
  [6] 
 
Moreover, those properties are independent. 
 
                                                        
4
  The first part of the normalization property has to be adjusted to the new domain, by letting 
0 lim ( ,...) 0 Y Y    . We call normalization (with inverted commas) to this modified property.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




Theorem 2 identifies the generalized mean of order   as the right formula to evaluate 
the performance of the society, where   is the parameter that incorporates our concern for 
equality across agents and dimensions (or the degree of substitutability). 
 
Remark: Theorem 1 is not a particular case of Theorem 2 because the domain on 
which the evaluation function is defined is different. 
 
The set of those who meet the standards is now given by all agents whose vectors of 
weighted relative realizations,  (,)
k
i   yz  R , are above (resp. below) the hypersurface de-
fined by    / jK jK j ij j j yz

    . Therefore, choosing   (the elasticity of substitution) 
amounts to fix the bonus/malus frontier. In particular,    (resp.   ) corresponds 
to the extreme case in which an agent meets the standards when she is above the targets in all 
dimensions simultaneously (resp. above some target); that is, the max (resp. the min) function. 
As for the intermediate cases, we find two of special relevance: the arithmetic mean, associated 
to the value  1   , discussed in the former section, and the geometric mean, associated to the 
value  0   . A similar reasoning applies to the case of achieving some target, with respect to 




iN iN ii z

     . 
From a different viewpoint the parameter   may be regarded as an equality coefficient 
in the following sense: the smaller the value of   the more weight we attach to a more egalitarian 
distribution of the agents' achievements, both among themselves and with respect to the different 
dimensions. The case  1    shows no concern for the distribution, as only the sum of the 
achievements matters (inequality neutrality). Values of   smaller than one correspond to ine-
quality aversion. The geometric mean, in particular, penalizes moderately the unequal distribution 
of the achievements, whereas the extreme case    (resp.   ) implies caring only 
about the smallest (resp. the highest) achievement of each agent. 
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The parameter   controls de degree of substitutability among the different dimensions 
on an indifference curve,  (,,,) i CY q
  z  . The smaller the value of   the more difficult to 
substitute the achievement in one dimension by that in another one. In the limit, no substitution 
is allowed so that meeting the standards implies surpassing all target levels. 
Similarly, assuming that the reference values correspond to absolute thresholds externally 



















The parameter   tells us now about the substitutability between individuals within a 
given dimension. The higher the value of   the easier to substitute the achievement of one 
individual by the achievement of another one, and vice versa. 
4. Empirical  Illustrations 
LET us consider the application of our model to the evaluation of the two problems presented 
in Examples 1 and 2 in Section 1. 
4.1.  The European Union Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
The SGP establishes that all member states of the Euro zone have to satisfy the following 
two requirements: (a) An annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of the GDP; (b) A national debt 
lower than 60% of the GDP. Let us take those values as the thresholds applicable to evaluate the 
performance of the states in the Euro zone, ignoring all implementation issues and the re-
interpretations and refinements introduced later. Table 1 below provides the data on budget deficit 
and national debt for the 16 countries in the Euro zone, between 2006 and 2009. The question is to 
determine which countries do satisfy those criteria and which do not (note that here meeting the 
standards means producing outcomes which are below the thresholds). 
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TABLE 1:  Public debt and deficit in the Euro zone (2006-2009) 
















Belgium  -0.3 88.1 0.2 84.2 1.2 89.8  6  96.7 
Germany  1.6  67.6  -0.2  65 0 66  3.3  73.2 
Greece  3.6 97.8 5.1 95.7 7.7 99.2  13.6  115.1 
Spain  -2  39.6 -1.9 36.2  4.1  39.7 11.2 53.2 
France  2.3 63.7 2.7 63.8 3.3 67.5 7.5 77.6 
Ireland  -3 24.9  -0.1 25 7.3  43.9  14.3 64 
Italy  3.3 106.5 1.5 103.5 2.7 106.1 5.3 115.8 
Cyprus  1.2 64.6 -3.4 58.3 -0.9 48.4 6.1 56.2 
Luxembourg  -1.4 6.5 -3.6 6.7 -2.9  13.7 0.7 14.5 
Malta  2.6 63.7 2.2 61.9 4.5 63.7 3.8 69.1 
Netherlands  -0.5 47.4 -0.2 45.5 -0.7 58.2 5.3 60.9 
Austria 1.5  62.2  0.4  59.5 0.4 62.6 3.4 66.5 
Portugal 3.9  64.7  2.6  63.6 2.8 66.3 9.4 76.8 
Slovenia  1.3  26.7 0 23.4 1.7 22.6 5.5 35.9 
Slovakia 3.5  30.5  1.9  29.3 2.3 27.7 6.8 35.7 
Finland  -4  39.7 -5.2 35.2 -4.2 34.2 2.2  44 
Average  1.3  68.3  0.6 66  2 69.4  6.3  78.7 
Source: Eurostat (Euroindicators 2010). 
 
This table suggests already several ways of interpreting the evaluation problem. On the 
one hand, we may consider that satisfying the performance criteria means meeting the standards 
every single year. In that case we would have four separate evaluation problems. On the other 
hand, we may also consider the evaluation for the whole period, as the performance of the 
countries is affected by the economic cycle. In that case we treat deficits and debt data corre-
sponding to different years as if they were different variables 
5.
 
Table 2 provides the summary data of the countries' performance under the two evalua-
tion approaches. In this case th 

















                                                        
5 Here we assume that the two dimensions are equally important and also that all years are equally 
weighted. Note, however, that our model would easily accommodate differences in those respects.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




TABLE 2:  Yearly performance of the Euro zone 
Deficit and debt together  All years 
Country \ Year 
2006  2007 2008 2009 
Global 
Deficit Debt 
Belgium 0.68  0.74  0.95 1.81  1.04  0.59  1.50 
Germany 0.83  0.51  0.55 1.16  0.76  0.39  1.13 
Greece  1.42  1.65 2.11 3.23  2.10  2.50  1.70 
Spain 0.00  -0.02  1.01 2.31  0.83  0.95  0.70 
France  0.91  0.98 1.11 1.90  1.23  1.32  1.14 
Ireland -0.29  0.19  1.58 2.92  1.10  1.54  0.66 
Italy 1.44  1.11  1.33  1.85 1.43 1.07  1.80 
Cyprus 0.74  -0.08  0.25  1.49  0.60  0.25  0.95 
Luxembourg -0.18  -0.54  -0.37 0.24  -0.21  -0.60  0.17 
Malta 0.96  0.88  1.28  1.21 1.08 1.09  1.08 
Netherlands 0.31  0.35  0.37 1.39  0.60  0.33  0.88 
Austria 0.77  0.56  0.59 1.12  0.76  0.48  1.05 
Portugal 1.19  0.96  1.02 2.21  1.34  1.56  1.13 
Slovenia 0.44  0.20  0.47 1.22  0.58  0.71  0.45 
Slovakia 0.84  0.56  0.61 1.43  0.86  1.21  0.51 
Finland -0.34  -0.57  -0.42 0.73  -0.15  -0.93  0.64 
Euro zone  0.79  0.65  0.91 1.71  1.01  0.85  1.18 
 




jK kz   , 
so that we can easily identify those who meet the standards. We present data for t = 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2009, for deficit and debt together (first four columns), the data on deficit and debt on 
the whole period (last two columns).  
The data show that, according to the criterion in [6’] there are only two countries that 
meet the standards year by year between 2006 and 2009: Luxembourg and Finland. There are 7 
more countries that satisfy the criteria when considering the whole period: Germany, Spain, 
Cyprus, Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia and Slovakia. There are the two countries that do not 
meet the standards in any of the years considered: Greece and Italy. 
Let us now consider whether the Stability and Growth Pact has been fulfilled collec-
tively along the years analyzed in Tables 1 and 2. To do so we let the weight i  of each country 
be given by its relative GDP. We observe that, taking the two objectives together there is only 
one year in which the Euro zone did not satisfy the criteria of the SGP (last row of Table 2). 
Yet the deviation was bad enough as to conclude that for the whole Euro zone and the whole 
period, the pact has not been fulfilled (as (.) 1.01). Looking at each objective individually, 
we observe that the Euro zone has collectively reached the deficit target (nine countries did it   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




individually) but has failed to satisfy the debt target (even though eight countries met that ob-
jective). All together the Euro zone has failed to meet the standards, even though nine of the 
countries have succeeded in doing it.  
4.2.  Research excellence in the Spanish Universities 
We now consider the evaluation of research excellence in the Spanish public universi-
ties, out of the data reported by Buela-Casal et al. (2010). These authors analyze the perform-
ance of the Spanish universities and provide an overall ranking using a set of variables whose 
relative weights are determined by the opinion of researchers obtained by a specific survey. 
Values are relative to the size of the permanent faculty in each university and are normalized so 
that the top university in each dimension gets a mark of 100 
6. 
Here we take three out of the six variables computed by those authors, as we under-
stand they are the most relevant ones. These variables are: publications (in terms of ISI pa-
pers), individual research productivity achievements, IRPA for short 
7, and success in get-
ting research funds competitively. In order to define excellence we take a relative vector of 
reference values given by:  1 75 z   for ISI publications,  2 85 z   for individual productivity 
achievements, and  3 50 z  . Those values correspond, approximately, to the percentile 85 in 
each category. As for the weights of the variables we re-scale those in the study that imply 
the following:  1 0,348    (papers),  2 0,328    (IRPA), and  3 0,324    (funds). Table 3 
provides the data corresponding to the 48 Spanish universities analyzed. 
 
                                                        
6 By permanent Faculty is understood here those people who are civil servants (funcionarios) within 
the categories that require a doctoral degree. That should be taken into account in order to interpret the 
results. 
7 The tramos de investigación, a voluntary individual research evaluation carried out every six years by a 
central agency, which results in a small salary increase.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




TABLE 3:  Research performance of the Spanish Universities 
Universities  ISI articles  Research bonuses  Research funds 
A Coruña  19.95  65.08  25.44 
Alcalá 43.72  85.71  36.65 
Alicante 48.95  80.95  31.2 
Almería 38.82  65.08  23.69 
Autónoma Barcelona  91.88  90.47  51.12 
Autónoma Madrid  72.61  95.24  45.79 
Barcelona 84.16  80.95  46.18 
Burgos 34.99  63.49  28.68 
Cádiz 30.16  66.67  19.03 
Cantabria 51.53  80.95  34.6 
Carlos III  62.01  100  55.53 
Castilla-La Mancha  57.63  77.78  36.6 
Complutense Madrid  27.65  77.78  32.13 
Córdoba 60.51  77.78  19.53 
Extremadura 39.38  77.78  19 
Girona 64.91  66.67  60.68 
Granada 42.92  77.78  26.94 
Huelva 42.66  63.49  22.3 
Islas Baleares  40.68  82.54  48.85 
Jaén 56.33  66.67  38.46 
Jaume I  40.5  79.36  33.06 
La Laguna  31.28  58.73  14.48 
La Rioja  35.56  69.84  25.45 
Las Palmas de G.C.  19.82  50.79  17.34 
León 29.86  73.01  21.99 
Lleida 51.15  69.84  49.94 
Málaga 30.27  69.84  20.47 
Miguel Hernández  97.28  90.47  49.78 
Murcia 41.51  77.78  25.67 
Oviedo 37.55  76.19  23.57 
Pablo de Olavide  80.58  92.06  62.22 
País Vasco  19.23  68.25  31.44 
Politécnica Cartagena  53.5  69.84  26.67 
Politécnica Cataluña  46.93  74.6  42.55 
Politécnica Madrid  30.04  50.79  26.89 
Politécnica Valencia  62.32  63.49  34.95 
Pompeu Fabra  100  87.3  100 
Pública Navarra  44.22  74.6  27.28 
Rey Juan Carlos  51.48  71.43  52.43 
Rovira i Virgili  90.63  84.12  46.01   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




TABLE 3:  Research Performance of the Spanish Universities (cont.) 
Universities  ISI articles  Research bonuses  Research funds 
Salamanca 36.58  79.36  33.77 
Santiago Compostela  49.51  82.54  34.39 
Sevilla 36.29  76.19  25.71 
UNED 20.88  66.67  20.67 
Valencia 55.91  87.3  30.03 
Valladolid 31.52  69.84  23.22 
Vigo 56.65  66.67  31.11 
Zaragoza   46.4  79.36  29.86 
Source: Buela-Casal et al. (2010).  
 
The object of this exercise is to determine the set of universities that are excellent from 
the point of view of their research realizations in 2009 
8. If we consider the extreme value 
  , that is, those universities that are above the thresholds in all dimensions, we find that 
there are only three universities that meet those standards of excellence: Universitat Autònoma 
de Barcelona, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. If we take the 
case   0 (the geometric mean), we find five additional universities entering the bonus set: 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Universitat de Barcelona, Universidad Carlos III, Univer-
sidad Miguel Hernandez, and Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Reducing the level of exigency to 
  1 (the arithmetic mean) does not add new universities to that set. Finally, for the other 
extreme value,    (namely, the set of universities that satisfy at least one of those crite-
ria), we find that the set of excellent universities includes five more: Alcalá, Girona, Lleida, 
Rey Juan Carlos, and Valencia. 
Table 4 gives the data of the 8 universities that meet the excellence standards using the 
geometric and/or the arithmetic mean. The table contains their relative arithmetic mean scores, 
information about the region in which those universities are placed, and whether they are new 
(created in the last twenty years, say), modern (created in the 60's) or traditional (with a history 
of hundreds of years). Even though discussing those data is not the purpose of this exercise, it is 
quite noticeable the success of the Catalan universities and the dominance of new and modern 
universities over the traditional ones. 
 
 
                                                        
8
 The results presented here correspond to the original figures after rounding them up to integer numbers 
plus at most two digits.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




TABLE 4:  Evaluation of the Spanish universities that meet the research standards 
Universities Score  Region  Type 
Pompeu Fabra  100  Catalonia  New 
Pablo de Olavide  78.15  Andalucía  New 
Miguel Hernández  77.51  Valencia  New 
Autònoma de Barcelona  76.38  Catalonia  Modern 
Rovira i Virgili  72.00  Catalonia  New 
Carlos III  71.33  Madrid  New 
Barcelona 69.16  Catalonia  Traditional 
Autónoma de Madrid  69.09  Madrid  Modern 
5. Final  Comments 
WE have provided here a criterion to evaluate the performance of a society with respect to a 
collection of targets. This criterion materializes in a simple an intuitive formula, a mean of or-
der   of the shares of the realizations in the targets, which has been characterized by means of 
standard requirements. The order of the mean is a parameter that determines the substitutability 
between the achievements and therefore the admissible degree of compensation among the 
various dimensions and the different agents. From this perspective the model can be regarded 
as producing endogenously a system of shadow prices that permits one to aggregate the differ-
ent dimensions. 
We have discussed in some detail the linear case, corresponding to the value  1   . 
There are good reasons to singularize this special case: 
 
(a)  It entails a principle very easy to understand: the arithmetic mean. This aspect may 
be important when the evaluation involves incentives, because understanding pro-
perly the incentives scheme is usually a necessary condition for its effectiveness. 
(b)  It permits one to perform the evaluation in the context of poor data. There are many 
situations in which we only have average values of realizations across agents but 
not individual data. Since the arithmetic mean of the original data coincides with 
the mean of the average values, we can apply this procedure even in the absence of 
rich data. 
(c)  It allows handling both positive and negative values of the variables.   Documento de Trabajo – Núm. 2/2011 




(d)  It fits well in those cases in which it is not clear whether one should penalize or foster 
diversity. Recall that values of   smaller than 1 penalize progressively the disper-
sion of the achievements whereas values of   greater than 1 do the contrary. So 
choosing    above or below unity amounts to promoting the differentiation of the 
agents' performance (specialization) or the homogeneous behavior (uniformity). The 
linear case represents preference neutrality regarding pooling or separating behavior. 
 
Needless to say there are contexts in which values   1 will be more suitable (e.g. 
when meeting the standards involves safety issues or when similar behavior is preferable). 
We have introduced the notions of weighted anonymity in order to deal with agents of 
different size or importance, and with targets of different relevance. The size of the agents will 
typically be related to the number of units within each agent (or the absolute value of their re-
alizations, as in the Stability and Growth Pact, discussed above). We can also think of a more 
complex determination of those weights, in particular when individual outcomes may be par-
tially interdependent. A case in point is that in which agents in society constitute a network 
(think for instance of the evaluation of research teams). In that case the weights may be associ-
ated to some measure of centrality (e.g. Ruhnau (2000), Ballester et al. (2006)).  
The presence of targets of different relevance is also common in many problems (e.g. 
weighting progressively less the past realizations when evaluating the outcomes along a given 
period of time). A different problem is that of handling targets with different degrees of prior-
ity, that is, targets that admit different degrees of substitutability (e.g. a group of targets have to 
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